CERGE-EI, Prague, Czech Republic

August 26, 2022, 11:00, Room GC B1 10 (click here for the map)

Optimally biased expertise

A principal needs to delegate a decision under uncertainty to an agent and chooses among candidates who differ in their prior beliefs. Prior to making the decision, the agents can flexibly acquire costly information. We show that the principal can generally benefit from delegation when the agent's belief differs from the belief of the principal. We also show that in a class of problems, hiring an agent with misaligned beliefs performs as well as action-contingent transfers, and is better than restricting the action set.


Pavel is a Ph.D. student at CERGE-EI, Prague, Czech Republic. His main research interest is Theoretical Behavioral Economics, mainly the theory of Rational Inattention. Pavel received an MA degree in Economics from European University at Saint Petersburg in 2017 and an MSc degree in Applied Mathematics from St Petersburg State University in 2014. He published a paper about discrete choice which connects rational inattention and conformity theories.