Choice theory

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Choice: outcome of a sequential decision-making process

- Definition of the choice problem: How do I get to EPFL?
- Generation of alternatives: car as driver, car as passenger, train
- Evaluation of the attributes of the alternatives: price, time, flexibility, comfort
- Choice: decision rule
- Implementation: travel





A choice theory defines

- 1. decision maker
- 2. alternatives
- 3. attributes of alternatives
- 4. decision rule





Decision-maker:

- Individual or a group of persons
- If group of persons, we ignore internal interactions
- Important to capture difference in tastes and decision-making process
- Socio-economic characteristics: age, gender, income, education, etc.



Alternatives:

- Environment: universal choice set (*U*)
- Individual n: choice set (C_n)

Choice set generation:

- Availability
- Awareness

Swait, **J.** (1984) *Probabilistic Choice Set Formation in Transportation Demand Models* Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Civil Engineering, MIT, Cambridge, Ma.






Continuous vs. discrete

Continuous choice set:

 q_{Milk}



Discrete choice set:



$$C_n = \{ Car, Bus, Bike \}$$



Attributes

- → cost
- → travel time
- → walking time
- → comfort
- → bus frequency
- → etc.

- ✔ Generic vs. specific
- Quantitative vs. qualitative
- ✔ Perception





Decision rules

Neoclassical economic theory Preference-indifference operator \gtrsim

(i) reflexivity

$$a \gtrsim a \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{C}_n$$

(ii) transitivity

$$a \gtrsim b \text{ and } b \gtrsim c \Rightarrow a \gtrsim c \quad \forall a, b, c \in \mathcal{C}_n$$

(iii) comparability

$$a \gtrsim b \text{ or } b \gtrsim a \quad \forall a, b \in \mathcal{C}_n$$





Decision rules

Neoclassical economic theory (ctd)

Numerical function

$$\exists U_n : \mathcal{C}_n \longrightarrow \mathbb{R} : a \leadsto U_n(a) \text{ such that }$$

$$a \gtrsim b \Leftrightarrow U_n(a) \ge U_n(b) \quad \forall a, b \in \mathcal{C}_n$$

Utility



Decision rules

- Utility is a latent concept
- It cannot be directly observed





Continuous choice set

- $Q = \{q_1, \dots, q_L\}$ consumption bundle
- q_i is the quantity of product i consumed
- Utility of the bundle:

$$U(q_1,\ldots,q_L)$$

- $Q_a \gtrsim Q_b$ iff $U(q_1^a, \dots, q_L^a) \geq U(q_1^b, \dots, q_L^b)$
- Budget constraint:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{L} p_i q_i \le I.$$





Decision-maker solves the optimization problem

$$\max_{q \in \mathbb{R}^L} U(q_1, \dots, q_L)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{i=1}^{L} p_i q_i = I.$$

Example with two products...



$$\max_{q_1, q_2} U = \beta_0 q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2}$$

subject to

$$p_1 q_1 + p_2 q_2 = I.$$

Lagrangian of the problem:

$$L(q_1, q_2, \lambda) = \beta_0 q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2} + \lambda (I - p_1 q_1 - p_2 q_2).$$

Necessary optimality condition

$$\nabla L(q_1, q_2, \lambda) = 0$$





Necessary optimality conditions

$$\beta_0 \beta_1 q_1^{\beta_1 - 1} q_2^{\beta_2} - \lambda p_1 = 0$$

$$\beta_0 \beta_2 q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2 - 1} - \lambda p_2 = 0$$

$$p_1 q_1 + p_2 q_2 - I = 0.$$

We have

$$\beta_0 \beta_1 q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2} - \lambda p_1 q_1 = 0$$

$$\beta_0 \beta_2 q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2} - \lambda p_2 q_2 = 0$$

so that

$$\lambda I = \beta_0 q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2} (\beta_1 + \beta_2)$$



Therefore

$$\beta_0 q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2} = \frac{\lambda I}{(\beta_1 + \beta_2)}$$

As $\beta_0\beta_2q_1^{\beta_1}q_2^{\beta_2}=\lambda p_2q_2$, we obtain (assuming $\lambda\neq 0$)

$$q_2 = \frac{I\beta_2}{p_2(\beta_1 + \beta_2)}$$

Similarly, we obtain

$$q_1 = \frac{I\beta_1}{p_1(\beta_1 + \beta_2)}$$



$$q_1 = \frac{I\beta_1}{p_1(\beta_1 + \beta_2)}$$

$$q_2 = \frac{I\beta_2}{p_2(\beta_1 + \beta_2)}$$

Demand functions





Discrete choice set

- Similarities with Knapsack problem
- Calculus cannot be used anymore

$$U = U(q_1, \dots, q_L)$$

with

$$q_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if product } i \text{ is chosen} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and

$$\sum_{i} q_i = 1.$$





- Do not work with demand functions anymore
- Work with utility functions
- *U* is the "global" utility
- Define U_i the utility associated with product i.
- It is a function of the attributes of the product (price, quality, etc.)
- We say that product i is chosen if

$$U_i \ge U_j \quad \forall j.$$





Example: two transportation modes

$$U_1 = -\beta t_1 - \gamma c_1$$

$$U_2 = -\beta t_2 - \gamma c_2$$

with β , $\gamma > 0$

$$U_1 \ge U_2 \text{ iff } -\beta t_1 - \gamma c_1 \ge -\beta t_2 - \gamma c_2$$

that is

$$-\frac{\beta}{\gamma}t_1 - c_1 \ge -\frac{\beta}{\gamma}t_2 - c_2$$

or

$$c_1 - c_2 \le -\frac{\beta}{\gamma}(t_1 - t_2)$$






Obvious cases:


- $c_1 \ge c_2$ and $t_1 \ge t_2$: 2 dominates 1.
- $c_2 \ge c_1$ and $t_2 \ge t_1$: 1 dominates 2.
- Trade-offs in over quadrants











Assumptions

Decision rules

Neoclassical economic theory (ctd) Decision-maker

- perfect discriminating capability
- ✓ full rationality
- ✓ permanent consistency

Analyst

- knowledge of all attributes
- ightharpoonup perfect knowledge of \gtrsim (or $U_n(\cdot)$)
- ✓ no measurement error





Assumptions

Uncertainty

Source of uncertainty?

Decision-maker: stochastic decision rules


Analyst: lack of information



Bohr: "Nature is stochastic"

Einstein: "God does not play

dice"





Assumptions

Lack of information: random utility models

Manski 1973 The structure of Random Utility Models *Theory and Decision* 8:229–254 Sources of uncertainty:

- Unobserved attributes
- Unobserved taste variations
- Measurement errors
- Instrumental variables

For each individual n,

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in}$$

and

$$P(i|\mathcal{C}_n) = P[U_{in} = \max_{j \in \mathcal{C}_n} U_{jn}] = P(U_{in} \ge U_{jn} \ \forall j \in \mathcal{C}_n)$$



Random utility models

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in}$$

- Dependent variable is latent
- Only differences matter

$$P(i|\mathcal{C}_n) = P(U_{in} \ge U_{jn} \ \forall j \in \mathcal{C}_n)$$

= $P(U_{in} + K \ge U_{jn} + K \ \forall j \in \mathcal{C}_n) \ \forall K \in \mathbb{R}$

$$P(i|\mathcal{C}_n) = P(U_{in} \ge U_{jn} \ \forall j \in \mathcal{C}_n)$$

= $P(\lambda U_{in} \ge \lambda U_{jn} \ \forall j \in \mathcal{C}_n) \ \forall \lambda > 0$

