

Incorporating advanced behavioral models in integer optimization

Michel Bierlaire Shadi Sharif Azadeh

Transport and Mobility Laboratory
School of Architecture, Civil and Environmental Engineering
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne

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Outline

- 1 Demand and supply
 - Example: one theater
- 2 Measuring satisfaction
 - Example: two theaters
- 3 Linear representation of demand
 - A simple example
 - A linear formulation
- 4 Dealing with capacities
 - Example: two theaters
- 5 Conclusion




Demand models



- Supply = infrastructure
- Demand = behavior, choices
- Congestion = mismatch

Demand models



- Usually in OR:
- optimization of the supply
- for a given (fixed) demand

Aggregate demand



- Homogeneous population
- Identical behavior
- Price (P) and quantity (Q)
- Demand functions: $P = f(Q)$
- Inverse demand: $Q = f^{-1}(P)$

Disaggregate demand



- Heterogeneous population
- Different behaviors
- Many variables:
 - Attributes: price, travel time, reliability, frequency, etc.
 - Characteristics: age, income, education, etc.
- Complex demand/inverse demand functions.

Demand-supply interactions

Operations Research

- Given the demand...
- configure the system

Behavioral models

- Given the configuration of the system...
- predict the demand


Johnson City Enterprise.
Published Every Saturday,
\$1. per year—Advance Payment.
SATURDAY, APRIL 7, 1883.

TIME TABLE
E. T. V. & G. R. R.

PASSENGER,	ARRIVES,
No. 1, West,	6:37, a. m.
No. 2, East,	9:45, p. m.
No. 3, West,	11:51, p.m.
No. 4, East,	3:56, a. m.
LOCAL FREIGHT,	ARRIVES,
No. 5,	7:20, a. m.
No. 8,	6:20, p. m.

Jno. W. EAKIN, Agent.

E. T. & W. N. C. R. R.
Passenger, leaves, 7, a. m.
" arrives, 6, p. m.
J. C. HARDIN, Agent.



Demand-supply interactions

Multi-objective optimization

Minimize costs



Maximize satisfaction




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Measuring satisfaction



Behavioral models

- Demand = sequence of choices
- Choosing means trade-offs
- In practice: derive trade-offs from choice models

Choice models

Theoretical foundations

- Random utility theory
- Choice set: \mathcal{C}_n
- $y_{in} = 1$ if $i \in \mathcal{C}_n$, 0 if not
- Logit model:

$$P(i|\mathcal{C}_n) = \frac{y_{in}e^{V_{in}}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}_n} y_{jn}e^{V_{jn}}}$$



2000



Decision rules

Neoclassical economic theory

Preference-indifference operator \succsim

① reflexivity

$$a \succsim a \quad \forall a \in \mathcal{C}_n$$

② transitivity

$$a \succsim b \text{ and } b \succsim c \Rightarrow a \succsim c \quad \forall a, b, c \in \mathcal{C}_n$$

③ comparability

$$a \succsim b \text{ or } b \succsim a \quad \forall a, b \in \mathcal{C}_n$$

Decision rules

Utility

$$\exists U_n : \mathcal{C}_n \longrightarrow \mathbb{R} : a \rightsquigarrow U_n(a) \text{ such that}$$

$$a \succsim b \Leftrightarrow U_n(a) \geq U_n(b) \quad \forall a, b \in \mathcal{C}_n$$

Remarks

- Utility is a latent concept
- It cannot be directly observed



Example

Two transportation modes

$$U_1 = -\beta t_1 - \gamma c_1$$

$$U_2 = -\beta t_2 - \gamma c_2$$

with $\beta, \gamma > 0$

$$U_1 \geq U_2 \text{ iff } -\beta t_1 - \gamma c_1 \geq -\beta t_2 - \gamma c_2$$


that is

$$-\frac{\beta}{\gamma} t_1 - c_1 \geq -\frac{\beta}{\gamma} t_2 - c_2$$


or

$$c_1 - c_2 \leq -\frac{\beta}{\gamma} (t_1 - t_2)$$

Example



Example



Assumptions

Decision-maker

- perfect discriminating capability
- full rationality
- permanent consistency

Analyst

- knowledge of all attributes
- perfect knowledge of \succsim (or $U_n(\cdot)$)
- no measurement error

Must deal with uncertainty

- Random utility models
- For each individual n and alternative i

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in}$$

and

$$P(i|C_n) = P[U_{in} = \max_{j \in C_n} U_{jn}] = P(U_{in} \geq U_{jn} \forall j \in C_n)$$

Logit model

Utility

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in}$$

- Decision-maker n
- Alternative $i \in \mathcal{C}_n$

Choice probability

$$P_n(i|\mathcal{C}_n) = \frac{y_{in}e^{V_{in}}}{\sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}} y_{jn}e^{V_{jn}}}$$



Variables: $x_{in} = (z_{in}, s_n)$

Attributes of alternative i : z_{in}

- Cost / price
- Travel time
- Waiting time
- Level of comfort
- Number of transfers
- Late/early arrival
- etc.


Characteristics of decision-maker n :

s_n

- Income
- Age
- Sex
- Trip purpose
- Car ownership
- Education
- Profession
- etc.



Demand curve



Disaggregate model

$$P_n(i|c_{in}, z_{in}, s_n)$$

Total demand

$$D(i) = \sum_n P_n(i|c_{in}, z_{in}, s_n)$$

Difficulty

Non linear and non convex in c_{in} and z_{in}

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A simple example



Data

- \mathcal{C} : set of movies
- Population of N individuals
- Utility function:

$$U_{in} = \beta_{in} p_{in} + f(z_{in}) + \varepsilon_{in}$$

Decision variables

- What movies to propose? y_i
- What price? p_{in}

Demand model

Logit model

Probability that n chooses movie i :


$$P(i|y, p_n, z_n) = \frac{y_i e^{\beta_{in} p_{in} + f(z_{in})}}{\sum_j y_j e^{\beta_{jn} p_{jn} + f(z_{jn})}}$$

Total revenue:

$$\sum_{i \in C} y_i \sum_{n=1}^N p_{in} P(i|y, p_n, z_n)$$

Non linear and non convex in the decision variables

The main idea



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The main idea

Linearization

Hopeless to linearize the logit formula (we tried...)

First principles

Each customer solves an optimization problem

Solution

Use the utility and not the probability



A linear formulation

Utility function

$$U_{in} = V_{in} + \varepsilon_{in} = \sum_k \beta_k x_{ink} + f(z_{in}) + \varepsilon_{in}.$$

Simulation

- Assume a distribution for ε_{in}
- E.g. logit: i.i.d. extreme value
- Draw R realizations ξ_{inr} ,
 $r = 1, \dots, R$
- The choice problem becomes deterministic



Scenarios

Draws

- Draw R realizations ξ_{inr} , $r = 1, \dots, R$
- We obtain R scenarios

$$U_{inr} = \sum_k \beta_k x_{ink} + f(z_{in}) + \xi_{inr}.$$

- For each scenario r , we can identify the largest utility.
- It corresponds to the chosen alternative.



Comparing utilities

Variables

$$\mu_{ijnr} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } U_{inr} \geq U_{jnr}, \\ 0 & \text{if } U_{inr} < U_{jnr}. \end{cases}$$

Constraints

$$(\mu_{ijnr} - 1)M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq \mu_{ijnr}M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

where

$$|U_{inr} - U_{jnr}| \leq M_{nr}, \forall i, j,$$

Comparing utilities

Constraints: $\mu_{ijnr} = 1$

$$0 \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

$$U_{jnr} \leq U_{inr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

Constraints: $\mu_{ijnr} = 0$

$$-M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq 0, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

$$U_{inr} \geq U_{jnr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

Accounting for availabilities

Motivation

- If $y_i = 0$, alternative i is not available.
- Its utility should not be involved in any constraint.

New variables: two alternatives are both available

$$\eta_{ij} = y_i y_j$$

Linearization:

$$y_i + y_j \leq 1 + \eta_{ij},$$

$$\eta_{ij} \leq y_i,$$

$$\eta_{ij} \leq y_j.$$

Comparing utilities of available alternatives

Constraints

$$M_{nr}\eta_{ij} - 2M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} - M_{nr}\mu_{ijnr} \leq (1 - \eta_{ij})M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

$$\eta_{ij} = 1 \text{ and } \mu_{ijnr} = 1$$

$$0 \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

$$\eta_{ij} = 1 \text{ and } \mu_{ijnr} = 0$$

$$-M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq 0, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

Comparing utilities of available alternatives

Constraints

$$M_{nr}\eta_{ij} - 2M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} - M_{nr}\mu_{ijnr} \leq (1 - \eta_{ij})M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

$$\eta_{ij} = 0 \text{ and } \mu_{ijnr} = 1$$

$$-M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq 2M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r,$$

$$\eta_{ij} = 0 \text{ and } \mu_{ijnr} = 0$$

$$-2M_{nr} \leq U_{inr} - U_{jnr} \leq M_{nr}, \forall i, j, n, r,$$

Comparing utilities of available alternatives

Valid inequalities

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_{ijnr} &\leq y_i, & \forall i, j, n, r, \\ \mu_{ijnr} + \mu_{jijnr} &\leq 1, & \forall i, j, n, r.\end{aligned}$$

The choice

Variables

$$w_{inr} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } n \text{ chooses } i \text{ in scenario } r, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Maximum utility

$$w_{inr} \leq \mu_{ijnr}, \forall i, j, n, r.$$

Availability

$$w_{inr} \leq y_i, \forall i, n, r.$$

The choice

One choice

$$\sum_{i \in C} w_{inr} = 1, \forall n, r.$$



Demand and revenues

Demand

$$D_i = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{n=1}^n \sum_{r=1}^R w_{inr}.$$

Revenues

$$R_i = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{n=1}^N p_{in} \sum_{r=1}^R w_{inr}.$$

Revenues

Non linear specification

$$R_i = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{n=1}^N p_{in} \sum_{r=1}^R w_{inr}.$$

Predetermined price levels

Price levels: p_{in}^{ℓ} , $\ell = 1, \dots, L_{in}$

$$p_{in} = \sum_{\ell=1}^{L_{in}} \lambda_{in\ell} p_{in}^{\ell}.$$

New decision variables

$\lambda_{in\ell} \in \{0, 1\}$

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{L_{in}} \lambda_{in\ell} = 1.$$

Revenues

Non linear function

$$R_i = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{\ell=1}^{L_{in}} \lambda_{in\ell} P_{in}^{\ell} \sum_{r=1}^R w_{inr}.$$

Linearization

$$\alpha_{inr\ell} = \lambda_{in\ell} w_{inr}$$



Linear specification of revenues

$$R_i = \frac{1}{R} \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{r=1}^R \sum_{\ell=1}^{L_{in}} \alpha_{inr\ell} p_{in}^{\ell},$$

with

$$\lambda_{in\ell} + w_{inr} \leq 1 + \alpha_{inr\ell}, \forall i, n, r, \ell,$$

$$\alpha_{inr\ell} \leq \lambda_{in\ell}, \forall i, n, r, \ell,$$

$$\alpha_{inr\ell} \leq w_{inr}, \forall i, n, r, \ell.$$



Back to the example: pricing



Data


- Two alternatives: my theater (m) and the competition (c)
- We assume an homogeneous population of N individuals

$$U_c = 0 + \varepsilon_c$$

$$U_m = \beta_c p_m + \varepsilon_m$$

- $\beta_c < 0$
- Logit model: ε_m i.i.d. EV

Demand and revenues



Optimization (with GLPK)

Data

- $N = 1$
- $R = 100$
- $U_m = -10p_m + 3$
- Prices: 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50

Results

- Optimum price: 0.3
- Demand: 56%
- Revenues: 0.168



Heterogeneous population



Two groups in the population

$$U_{in} = -\beta_n p_i + c_n$$


Young fans: 2/3

$$\beta_1 = -10, c_1 = 3$$

Others: 1/3

$$\beta_1 = -0.9, c_1 = 0$$

Demand and revenues



Optimization

Data


- $N = 3$
- $R = 100$
- $U_{m1} = -10p_m + 3$
- $U_{m2} = -0.9p_m$
- Prices: 0.3, 0.7, 1.1, 1.5, 1.9

Results

- Optimum price: 0.3
- Customer 1 (fan): 60% [theory: 50 %]
- Customer 2 (fan) : 49% [theory: 50 %]
- Customer 3 (other) : 45% [theory: 43 %]
- Demand: 1.54 (51%)
- Revenues: 0.48



Two theaters, different types of films



Two theaters, different types of films

Theater m

- Expensive
- Star Wars Episode VII

Theater k

- Cheap
- Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy

Heterogeneous demand

- Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
- One third of the population is old (less price sensitive)

Two theaters, different types of films

Data

- Theaters m and k
- $N = 6$
- $R = 10$
- $U_{mn} = -10p_m + \textcircled{4}$, $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$, $n = 3, 6$
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + \textcircled{0}$, $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$, $n = 3, 6$
- Prices m : 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
- Prices k : half price

Theater m

- Optimum price m : 1.6
- 4 young customers: 0
- 2 old customers: 0.5
- Demand: 0.5 (8.3%)
- Revenues: 0.8

Theater k

- Optimum price m : 0.5
- Young customers: 0.8
- Old customers: 1.5
- Demand: 2.3 (38%)
- Revenues: 1.15

Two theaters, same type of films

Theater m

- Expensive
- Star Wars Episode VII

Theater k

- Cheap
- Star Wars Episode VIII

Heterogeneous demand

- Two third of the population is young (price sensitive)
- One third of the population is old (less price sensitive)

Two theaters, same type of films

Data

- Theaters m and k
- $N = 6$
- $R = 10$
- $U_{mn} = -10p_m + 4$,
 $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$, $n = 3, 6$
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + 4$,
 $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$, $n = 3, 6$
- Prices m : 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
- Prices k : half price

Theater m

- Optimum price m : 1.8
- Young customers: 0
- Old customers: 1.9
- Demand: 1.9 (31.7%)
- Revenues: 3.42

Theater k

Closed


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Dealing with capacities

- Demand may exceed supply
- Not every choice can be accommodated
- Difficulty: who has access?
- Assumption: priority list is exogenous



Priority list

Application dependent

- First in, first out
- Frequent travelers
- Subscribers
- ...

In this framework

The list of customers must be sorted



Dealing with capacities

Variables

- y_{in} : decision of the operator
- y_{inr} : availability

Constraints

$$\sum_{n=1}^N w_{inr} \leq c_i$$

$$y_{inr} \leq y_{in}$$

$$y_{i(n+1)r} \leq y_{inr}$$

Constraints

$$c_i(1 - y_{inr}) \leq \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} + (1 - y_{in})c_{\max}$$

$$y_{in} = 1, y_{inr} = 1$$

$$0 \leq \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr}$$

$$y_{in} = 1, y_{inr} = 0$$

$$c_i \leq \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr}$$

$$y_{in} = 0, y_{inr} = 0$$

$$c_i \leq \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} + c_{\max}$$

Constraints

$$\sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} + (1 - y_{in})c_{\max} \leq (c_i - 1)y_{inr} + \max(n, c_{\max})(1 - y_{inr})$$

$$y_{in} = 1, y_{inr} = 1$$

$$1 + \sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} \leq c_i$$

$$y_{in} = 1, y_{inr} = 0$$

$$\sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} \leq \max(n, c_{\max})$$

$$y_{in} = 0, y_{inr} = 0$$

$$\sum_{m=1}^{n-1} w_{imr} + c_{\max} \leq \max(n, c_{\max})$$

Two theaters, different types of films

Data

- Theaters m and k
- Capacity: 2
- $N = 6$
- $R = 5$
- $U_{mn} = -10p_m + 4$, $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$, $n = 3, 6$
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + 0$, $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$, $n = 3, 6$
- Prices m : 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8
- Prices k : half price

Theater m

- Optimum price m : 1.8
- Demand: 0.2 (3.3%)
- Revenues: 0.36

Theater k

- Optimum price m : 0.5
- Demand: 2 (33.3%)
- Revenues: 1.15

Example of two scenarios

Customer	Choice	Capacity m	Capacity k
1	0	2	2
2	0	2	2
3	k	2	1
4	0	2	1
5	0	2	1
6	k	2	0

Customer	Choice	Capacity m	Capacity k
1	0	2	2
2	k	2	1
3	0	2	1
4	k	2	0
5	0	2	0
6	0	2	0

Two theaters: all prices divided by 2

Data

- Theaters m and k
- Capacity: 2
- $N = 6$
- $R = 5$
- $U_{mn} = -10p_m + 4$, $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{mn} = -0.9p_m$, $n = 3, 6$
- $U_{kn} = -10p_k + 0$, $n = 1, 2, 4, 5$
- $U_{kn} = -0.9p_k$, $n = 3, 6$
- Prices m : 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
- Prices k : half price

Theater m

- Optimum price m : 0.5
- Demand: 1.4
- Revenues: 0.7

Theater k

- Optimum price m : 0.45
- Demand: 1.6
- Revenues: 0.72

Example of two scenarios

Customer	Choice	Capacity m	Capacity k
1	0	2	2
2	0	2	2
3	0	2	2
4	k	2	1
5	k	2	0
6	0	2	0

Customer	Choice	Capacity m	Capacity k
1	k	2	1
2	k	2	0
3	0	2	0
4	m	1	0
5	0	1	0
6	m	0	0

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Summary

Demand and supply

- Supply: prices and capacity
- Demand: choice of customers
- Interaction between the two

Discrete choice models

- Rich family of behavioral models
- Strong theoretical foundations
- Great deal of concrete applications
- Capture the heterogeneity of behavior
- Probabilistic models

Optimization

Discrete choice models

- Non linear and non convex
- Idea: use utility instead of probability
- Rely on simulation to capture stochasticity


Proposed formulation

- Linear in the decision variables
- Large scale
- Fairly general



Number of draws

CPLEX implementation by Shadi



Ongoing research

- Decomposition methods
- Scenarios are (almost) independent from each other (except objective function)
- Individuals are also loosely coupled (except for capacity constraints)



Thank you!



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